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Abstract
In this study we argue that recognising humanitarian logistics (HL) as a complex system is a
key step in developing supply chain design and management strategies that meet the needs of
stakeholders. This study draws on complex adaptive systems theory to examine the character-
istics and implications of complexity for HL. Through case-study research of humanitarian
responses in Haiti and Pakistan, characteristics of complexity across organisational bound-
aries are identified. We find that the complexity of the context impacts the outcome of the
humanitarian response and conclude that HL must not only react to its environment, it must
also create its environment. As HL must work within significantly differing environments to
create solutions, the standardised approaches used tomanage supply chains are less desirable.
While this paper focuses on HL, wider applicability to other complex logistics operations is
also discussed, informing the design and management of contextually specific supply chains.
Keywords Humanitarian logistics · Complex adaptive system (CAS) · Case study · Supply
chain management
1 Introduction
The frequency and intensity of large-scale and catastrophic disasters, natural or human-made,
continues to increase (Day 2014). It has been reported that more than 200 million people
are affected by natural disasters each year (Yao et al. 2018) and their survival often relies
on the humanitarian assistance provided by private, military, government, and/or national
and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kovács and Spens 2009; Tatham
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and Houghton 2011; Kovács et al. 2012; Pérouse de Montclos 2012; Chapman and Mitchell
2018).
Humanitarian assistance is provided through humanitarian logistics (HL), a system con-
cerned with ‘planning, implementing and controlling the effective, cost-efficient flow and
storage of goods and materials as well as related information, from the point of origin to the
point of consumption for the purpose ofmeeting the end beneficiary’s requirements’ (Thomas
andMizushima 2005, p. 60). The annual expenditure of humanitarian assistance is estimated
at more than US$25 billion (Tatham and Pettit 2010), with HL activities approximated to
account for as much as 60–80% of the total cost of humanitarian operations (Blecken 2010).
Balancing the moral imperative that drives HL with the economic imperative for ensuring
value for money presents challenges for humanitarian logisticians (Beamon and Balcik 2008;
Gonçalves and Castañeda 2018; Naor et al. 2018; Cachon et al. 2020). In short, failure to
provide sufficient supply in a timely manner has the potential to cause serious losses or even
death (Thomas 2004; Tatham et al. 2009; Day et al. 2012; Turkeš et al. 2017; Chapman and
Mitchell 2018).
Academic and managerial interest in HL was piqued after the catastrophic HL failures of
the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia, with operational concerns such as custom clearance and
the congestion of ports and airports being of particular interest (Kovács and Spens 2011). It
has been suggested that HL presents a ‘wicked’ problem (Tatham and Houghton 2011). The
sheer number of stakeholders (each with their wildly differing views and objectives) leads to
increased complexity and performance issues (Hilhorst 2002; Vaillancourt 2016), in addition
to the ‘customers’ within the supply chain (SC) including both beneficiaries of aid and the
donors that provide it (Oloruntoba and Gray 2009; Charles et al. 2010; Schiffling and Piecyk
2014). Furthermore, HLmust operate under extreme time pressure (Dubey et al. 2019), often
in environments that have neither a functioning logistics system nor adequate administrative
or governmental structures (Pettit and Beresford 2009; Day et al. 2012). While there have
been some efforts towards standardisation in HL, each response is unique and depends on
local needs assessment and significant adaptations beyond the initial emergency response
phase (Kovács and Spens 2009; Richey 2009; Kunz et al. 2014).
TheHLcontext poses distinct challenges for the logistics functionwhen comparedwith the
demand-driven, steady-state SCs found in commercial industries where the required inputs
to achieve the desired results are generally known (Kovács and Spens 2007; Olaogbebikan
and Oloruntoba 2017; Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2020). Compared to the demand-driven,
steady-state commercial industries, HL operates in an exceedingly uncertain and dynamic
environment that is far beyond the control of any individual manager or organisation (Van
Wassenhove 2006; Day et al. 2012). However, due to their humanitarian mandate, humanitar-
ian organisations will not withdraw from such an environment, which necessitates agile and
resilient SCs (Stewart and Ivanov 2019). Given this challenging operational context, many
of the current frameworks we use to manage SCs have proven inadequate in the disaster
response context (Balcik et al. 2010). The field of HL is therefore considered to be a highly
dynamic, complex system (Gonçalves 2008). Research illustrates how managing HL efforts
cannot be approached in the samemanner as for unidirectional, linear SCs, but should instead
be examined as a dynamic system (Day 2014).
By examining humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan, we focus on the com-
plexity of the context and how the HL response adapts to complexity in order to provide
timely and sufficient resources to where they are needed. To do this, we adopt the theoretical
lens of complex adaptive systems (CAS). In the operations management literature, supply
networks have been characterised as CAS (Choi et al. 2001; Pathak et al. 2007). Similarly,
HL can also be viewed from the CAS perspective (Day 2014). It is characterised as complex
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and dynamic given that the agents generate nonlinear interactions over time, resulting in a
potential emerging system behaviour, e.g. supply network resilience (Day 2014). We took
a similar view and consider HL as a CAS. By utilising CAS theory we are able to develop
a detailed analysis of the key tenets of complexity from which we provide theoretical and
practical insights for HL.
HL has been recognised as an important research area by numerous scholars because of the
considerable financial, as well as moral implications of HL performance (Jabbour et al. 2017;
Banomyong et al. 2019; Anaya-Arenas et al. 2014). In parallel with its recognised importance
is the acknowledgement that HL operations are complex (Hilhorst 2002; Vaillancourt 2016),
yetmuch of this research ignores the complicating factors ofHL (Day et al. 2012) and research
examining the implications of complexity for HL is currently under-developed. Specifically,
the characteristics of complexity across organisational boundaries and the ways in which HL
responses interact with complexity are not sufficiently explored. By utilising the theoretical
lens of CAS we are able to shed light on how and why humanitarian response efforts can
yield vastly differing outcomes and offer recommendations as to how these differences can
be overcome.
Our study addresses the following research questions:
RQ1 What are the main characteristics of complexity in humanitarian logistics?
RQ2 How does the humanitarian logistics response adapt to complexity?
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the operating environment of
HL, explains our rationale for using CAS, and details the application of CAS to HL. In
the subsequent research design section, the data collection and data analysis are detailed.
Section 4 presents the case studies and Sect. 5 the cross-case analysis, structured by the three
foci of CAS. By drawing on our findings, we address our research questions in Sect. 6, before
we conclude the paper by reflecting on key theoretical and managerial insights as well as
discussing limitations and future research directions in Sect. 7.
2 Literature review
2.1 Understanding the complex operating environment of humanitarian logistics
The challenges of HL have been explored in great depth in the extant literature in recent years
(Behl and Dutta 2019; Gupta et al. 2019) and a common theme is the impact that the unique
and complex operating environment has on HL operations (Turkeš et al. 2017; Gunasekaran
et al. 2018). As this paper focuses on the main characteristics of complexity in HL, this
section reviews prior research on complexity within HL.
Firstly, the operating environment is dynamic, whereby temporary SCs must be hastily
formed under conditions of extreme uncertainty (Day 2014;Gao 2019). Secondly, the number
of stakeholders is significant,withmilitary, governmental, andprivate organisations of various
sizes and motivations typically involved (Kovács and Spens 2009; Balcik et al. 2010; Larson
and Foropon 2018). Stakeholders often have differing levels of capability and their conflicting
views and objectives often have a significant impact on HL performance (Hilhorst 2002;
Heaslip et al. 2012; Vaillancourt 2016). Thirdly, responses have to be timely, yet they are
often carried out in conflict zones with significant security threats, whilst also considering
long-term recovery as well as short-term emergency aid (Gustavsson 2003; Oloruntoba and
Kovács 2015).
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While these characteristics alone make for an extremely challenging operating environ-
ment, HL is further complicated by the uncertainties inherent in the humanitarian relief
industry. Many humanitarian organisations are facing skills and funding shortages, particu-
larly a lack of investment in technology and communication tools (Gustavsson 2003; Kovács
and Tatham 2010; Kovács et al. 2012). Logistics is often undervalued at a strategic level,
resulting in a lack of expertise in the area, which can impact on the accuracy of the infor-
mation needed to develop an informed HL response (Sandwell 2011). Added to all of this is
the over-reliance on donor funding, whereby donors become increasingly powerful players
in the SC due to their ability to only provide financial and material support if their individual
preferences and mandates are met (Hilhorst 2002; Kovács and Spens 2008). Co-ordination
and collaboration between the humanitarian organisations involved is paramount if a HL
operation is to succeed, and yet these activities are made more difficult as all of these organi-
sations differ vastly in their size and approach (Kovács and Spens 2009; Moshtari 2016), and
knowledge sharing is hampered by the chaotic and uncertain environment of HL (Pateman
et al. 2013; Heaslip and Barber 2014; Altay and Pal 2014; Gao 2019).
While there is a growing body of research in HL, scholars are critical of HL research that
ignores complicating factors or distorts the situations faced in practice (Day et al. 2012). HL
researchers are therefore encouraged to guard against over-simplifying inherently complex
and ill-structured situations (Apte 2009). Inspired by this, Day (2014) concluded that the dif-
ferences in the flows of finance, information, and resources are so great that HL efforts cannot
be managed in the same manner as unidirectional, linear SCs, but should instead be exam-
ined as dynamic and complex systems to better understand HL and to ‘generate more reliable
disaster relief performance’ (Day 2014, p. 1985). Other scholars have characterised HL as a
highly complex (Seybolt 2009; L’Hermitte et al. 2015; Stauffer et al. 2018) or ‘wicked’ prob-
lem (Tatham and Houghton 2011). However, definitions of the actors, processes and contexts
that comprise the dynamic and complex system of HL are under-developed in the literature.
Therefore, this paper aims to explore not only the characteristics of complexity experienced
in this scenario, but also the impact these characteristics have on HL responses. We present
findings from case-study research on complexity in HL and enhance our understanding of
the divergent outcomes of different humanitarian responses.
2.2 Theoretical lens: complex adaptive systems
The term CAS emerged from complexity theory (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Lewin 1993;
Kauffman 1995), which focuses on the emergence of order in dynamic and non-linear systems
that operate at the edge of chaos (Schneider and Somers 2006). A CAS is a type of system
that functions without any central control and lacks a permanent, fixed structure, yet is
nonetheless distinguishable from its surroundings, with examples including ecosystems and
cities (Holland 1995). Within a CAS, developing an understanding of its constituent ‘parts’
does not necessarily convey an understanding of the whole system’s behaviour (Brownlee
2007). The ‘parts’ of a CAS are independent agents. In operations management terms, an
agent may be an individual or an organisation, yet in scientific terms an agent may be a
molecule or a species. A CAS is considered complex, as it is diverse, and adaptive in that the
system has the capacity to alter and change based on learning from experience (Begun et al.
2003).
Studies that have viewed HL through a CAS lens have examined the applicability of
commercial SC thinking to humanitarian SC relationships (McLachlin and Larson 2011),
co-ordination in HL (Krejci 2015), and how HL resilience can be enhanced (Day 2014).
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Other studies also refer to HL as a CAS, however the definition of CAS is not always made
explicit, or the notion of HL as a CAS is taken as read and is not elaborated upon (e.g.
de Faria Cordeiro et al. 2015; Shafiee and Berglund 2016; Handayani et al. 2017). Prior
research suggests that this theoretical approach could add to the body of knowledge in HL
(Gupta et al. 2019). To better understand the complex interplay inherent in supply networks,
researchers suggest a CAS perspective (Langdon and Sikora 2006; Pathak et al. 2007; Li
et al. 2010; Schoenherr et al. 2012). Indeed, the humanitarian aid community as a whole
has been described as a complex, open, adaptive system (Seybolt 2009). HL exhibits the
characteristics of a CAS as the system-level behaviour that emerges cannot be predicted by
observing individual agents. It is complex in that it operates in a dynamic network of diverse
interacting agents, and it is adaptive in that the system redesigns over time corresponding
to internal or external stimuli. The activity of redesign is termed as self-organisation (Choi
et al. 2001). In its ability to learn from its experience, a CAS evolves based not only on
the dynamic interactions among its agents but also based on the interactions between the
environment and the agents. As part of a humanitarian response, individual organisations can
be seen as interacting adaptive agents that are united in a common purpose, i.e. providing
humanitarian assistance (Kovács and Spens 2009; Tatham and Houghton 2011; Kovács et al.
2012; Pérouse de Montclos 2012). No single agent can claim to manage and control the
entirety of the humanitarian effort. However, a system can support overall behaviour that is
significantly more complex than the behaviour of any individual agent (Van Dyke Parunak
1997).
2.3 Application of CAS to HL
We contribute to the extant literature by offering a more fine-grained approach that adopts
an analytical framework developed by Choi et al. (2001) which considers supply networks
as a CAS. By utilising a framework developed specifically to consider supply networks as a
CAS, Choi et al. (2001) argue that behaviours across the supply network can be interpreted
in a more complete manner and therefore interventions can be developed that are more likely
to deliver positive results. Both Krejci (2015) and Day (2014) refer to this framework in the
context of HL and we offer an extension to this body of work by offering empirical examples.
As per Choi et al. (2001), we consider an examination of a CAS to comprise the interplay
between the system and its environment, and the co-evolution of both the system and its
environment. For HL the system is the network of organisations that provide the humani-
tarian response and the environment is the context in which the humanitarian response is
provided (e.g. geographical location, political situation, accessibility) (Balcik et al. 2010).
In considering supply networks as a CAS, Choi et al. (2001) suggest three foci; internal
mechanisms, environment and co-evolution. The dynamics of these three foci provide the
framework for our study and allow us to examine and develop suggestions as to how the
design and management of HL can be improved. In contextualising each of these foci to
HL, we consider internal mechanisms as concerned with the agents (e.g. individuals and
organisations) that comprise the humanitarian relief effort. We are concerned with the con-
nectivity and the ability to self-organise in and between the agents and how information and
resources flow. Here, we also examine the norms, values, beliefs and assumptions that are
shared among agents. The environment exists external to the CAS; for HL this focus would
concern contextual, cultural, geographical, political and financial factors that could influence
change within the CAS. These environmental factors may be dynamic, and hence force the
CAS to exploit existing knowledge and explore new knowledge as part of the change (Choi
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Table 1 The three foci of complex adaptive systems in humanitarian logistics
CAS focus Humanitarian logistics context
Internal mechanisms Concerned with the agents that comprise the CAS
Agents are individuals and organisations that provide the humanitarian relief
effort. For example, private, military, governmental and non-governmental
organisations, donors and beneficiaries
Examines connectivity and ability to self-organise within and across these
individuals and organisations
Develops understanding of norms, values, beliefs and assumptions that are shared
among individuals and organisations
Environment Concerned with factors outside of the boundary of the CAS
For HL the environment may comprise contextual, cultural, geographical, political
and financial influences
Environmental factors may be dynamic in HL, and force the CAS to adapt quickly
to changing influences
Co-evolution Concerned with the CAS both reacting to and creating its environment
Concerned with changes in the equilibrium state between a CAS and its
environment
For HL, political instability, for example, in the geographic location where HL is
required can lead to unpredictable changes that influence the behaviour within
the CAS
Examines non-linearity as regards how a large change in input does not necessarily
result in a significant change in output
et al. 2001). The third focus, co-evolution, concerns the CAS both reacting to and creating
its environment. Feedback between the system and its environment forces change within the
CAS and also within the environment. Co-evolution may instigate a change from equilibrium
to disequilibrium between a system and its environment. For instance, political instability in
the geographic location where HL is required can lead to unpredictable changes that influ-
ence the behaviour within the CAS; an example of this would be the local government being
overthrown, resulting in changes to the balance of power, thereby forcing some HL actors to
withdraw from the region. Change is often non-linear in a CAS. Non-linearity implies that
there is an inconsistent relationship between the cause and effect of CAS events, such that
cause and effect can be difficult to predict, and this relationship may not be repeated, or that
extreme events may yield disproportionately negative or positive results (Wycisk et al. 2008).
For example, a large change in input (e.g. additional funds as donations) does not necessarily
lead to large changes in outcome (e.g. additional funds may not be used to their greatest
effect, or additional supplies purchased with the funds may not reach the intended recipi-
ents). Conversely, a small change in input may lead to a significant change in output (either
positive or negative). A CAS can therefore be hypersensitive to changes in its environment
(Choi et al. 2001). A summary of these three foci is included as Table 1.
These three foci are not independent of each other,meaning that, for example, non-linearity
(co-evolution focus) is affected by the CAS agents’ adaptation efforts but can also introduce
new patterns of self-organisation and emergence (internal mechanism focus) (McCarthy
et al. 2006). This may imply that different agents at different levels of a CAS share the same
concerns, such as increasing delivery speed and reducing costs (Surana et al. 2005; Wycisk
et al. 2008). As such, each individual agent aims to address their own concerns but may end
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up instigating the emergence of similar collective patterns at the wider system level (Pathak
et al. 2007).
In summary, HL can be defined as a CAS as it emerges over time into a coherent form and
adapts and organises itself without any singular entity deliberately managing or controlling
it (Holland 1995). Hence, employing the established theoretical lens of a CAS is regarded as
an important step towards understanding how the highly-complex operations of HL can be
designed and managed, and will enable the development of theoretical and practical insights
into how collective behaviours in delivering humanitarian responses can be coordinated
(Surana et al. 2005; Moshtari 2016). We do this by examining the humanitarian responses
to the Haitian earthquake and Pakistan floods (both of 2010) and outline our research design
below.
3 Research design
This study utilises a case study research design. Case studies are defined as ‘empirical enquiry
that investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context’ (Yin 2014, p. 14)
and are characterised by the collection of contextually rich data. This makes them a suitable
approach for the study of complex social phenomena in which a variety of variables, some
of them unknown to the researchers, shape particular responses or outcomes in a network of
interactions (Stake 2000; Flyvbjerg 2013). Case studies are commonly used to explore, and
make sense of, complexity (Flyvbjerg 2013;Yin 2014;Kreye et al. 2015; Campus et al. 2019),
with qualitative methods being noted as particularly appropriate for ‘allowing researchers to
deal with complexity, context and persona and their multitude of factors, relationships and
fuzzy phenomena’ (Cassell and Gummesson 2006, p. 167).
3.1 Data collection
Semi-structured interviews and document analysis provided the multiple data sources nec-
essary ‘to seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources
and methods’ (Bowen 2009, p. 28). This ‘combination of methodologies in the study of the
same phenomenon’ (Denzin 1970, p. 291) achieves triangulation, thus reducing any potential
biases and substantiating findings across datasets (Voss et al. 2002; Bowen 2009). Publicly
available documents for each of the organisations that participated in the interviews were
collected; these included mission reports, annual reports, operational updates, and intra-, as
well as inter-organisational reviews. In total, 18 interviews were conducted. Respondents all
worked within humanitarian NGOs, many with considerable experience at the time of the
interview (See Table 2 for details).
Interviewees were identified using a combination of theoretical sampling and snowball
sampling; some intervieweeswere contacted directly based on their role and the organisations
they worked for, while others were identified via referrals (Saunders et al. 2006; Bryman
2012). As most respondents were actively conducting humanitarian work around the world,
most interviews were conducted by phone or online via Voice Over IP. To protect their
anonymity, participants are only identified by an alphanumerical code, where ‘H’ stands for
participation in the Haiti case study and ‘P’ for Pakistan. A number is assigned at random to
each interviewee.
Four different types of non-profit organisations were included in this sample; UN agen-
cies, religious organisations conducting humanitarian operations according to faith-based
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Table 2 Length of service and job title of interviewees (adapted from Makepeace et al. 2017)
Interviewee Length of service within the
sector (years)
Length of service within the
organisation (years)
Job title
H1 8 5 Programmes Coordinator
H2 5 3 Head of Operations
H3 13 8 Head of Logistics and
Supply
H4 5 5 Chief Executive Officer
H5 4 1 Logistics and Procurement
Coordinator
H6 11 7 Director of Programmes
H7 9 6 Logistics Advisor
H8 12 9 Deputy Director
Procurement and
Logistics
H9 8 6 Operations Manager
H10 16 4 Country Supply Officer
P1 9 7 Medical Supply Officer
P2 4 2 Mission Support
P3 17 10 Operations Director
P4 4 1 Logistics and Procurement
Coordinator
P5 9 6 Logistics Advisor
P6 6 4 Mission Coordinator
P7 13 8 Head of Logistics and
Supply




objectives, Dunantist and Wilsonian organisations. Following the classification by Stoddard
(2003), Dunantist organisations are independent of, or even oppositional to, government
and are advocacy-focussed; in comparison, Wilsonian organisations are more dependent
and cooperative with government and are focussed on service delivery. Table 3 provides a
summary of the organisations that participated in the study.
As previous research has highlighted, humanitarian efforts do not end instantaneously after
the emergency response, but often merge into long-term efforts of recovery and rebuilding
(Day et al. 2012; Oloruntoba and Kovács 2015) with these interconnected phases being
a recognised source of complexity (McEntire 2004). Thus, interviews were conducted in
2014 and 2015 to allow for longer-term reflections on the humanitarian responses, including
considerations of outcomes. Asking respondents to recall events from several years ago
allowed the authors to focus on the immediate disaster response, whilst also acknowledging
the potential wider impacts of complexity.
While the sample size may be considered relatively limited when compared with large
scale logistics studies in different contexts, the poor availability of data in HL is widely
acknowledged (Kovács and Spens 2007;Natarajarathinam et al. 2009;Kunz andReiner 2012;
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Table 3 Organisational characteristics
Organisation Type Haiti Pakistan Interviewees Base Area Served
A Dunantist 1 H9 Single Country Global
B Dunantist 1 1 H3, P7 Global Global
C Dunantist 1 1 H7, P5 Global Global
D Dunantist 1 P3 Global Global
E Dunantist 2 P1, P6 Global Global
F Religious 1 H1 Single Country Single Country
G Religious 1 H2 Single Country Global
H UN 1 H10 Global Global
I UN 1 1 H5, P2 Global Global
J Wilsonian 1 H6 Global Global
K Wilsonian 1 H4 Single Country Global
L Wilsonian 1 1 H8, P8 Single Country Global
M Wilsonian 1 P4 Single Country Global
Pedraza-Martinez et al. 2013; Kovács and Moshtari 2019). Figure 1 provides an overview
of the boundaries of the two case studies. It highlights the different types of organisations
and visualises their differences in size. Care was taken in the sampling process to include
organisations of varying sizes, however in practice fewer smaller organisations responded to
the floods in Pakistan. Organisations B, C, I, and L were represented in both case studies. All
four of these organisations are of a considerable size and operate globally, with all except
organisation L also having a global base.
3.2 Data analysis
As interviewees were asked to recall events that had occurred some years ago, comparisons
across interviewee responses and with the secondary data were made after every interview to
establish any inconsistencies (Smith 2001). As inconsistencies were not identified across the
recollection of events, the associated challenges of analysing multiple versions of the ‘facts’
(whether misremembered, misinformed, withheld or untrue) did not need to be addressed
(Polishuk 1998). The interviews were recorded and their transcripts analysed in NVivo using,
initially, an a priori coding process (Miles et al. 2014).
In analysing our primary and secondary data, we drew on the approach adopted by Bhakoo
and Choi (2013). A priori first level codes were derived from the three interdependent foci
of the CAS framework utilised (internal mechanisms, environment, and co-evolution) (Choi
et al. 2001) and drew on contextual information as presented in Table 1. As per Table 1, opera-
tional definitions of each code were developed, thus providing a clear guideline regarding the
contents to be coded. For example, when coding against ‘internal mechanisms’, interview
comments and secondary data referring to connectivity between agents and/or the norms,
values, beliefs and assumptions shared between the agents were of interest. For ‘environ-
ment’, the coding process was concerned with identifying primary and secondary data about
factors outside of the boundary of the CAS, which were expected to be based around con-
textual, cultural, geographical, political and financial influences. Finally, for ‘co-evolution’,
coding focused on collecting interview responses and secondary data detailing changes in
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Fig. 1 Overview of case studies and interview participants
the equilibrium state between the CAS and its environment and examples of non-linearity.
Each interview was coded on at least two separate occasions as recommended by Miles et al.
(2014), revisiting the initial coding after several days to ensure internal consistency. The data
analysis process continued until a point of saturation was reached (Robson 2011).
Validity and reliability are key considerations in presenting the findings of the case-study
research (Creswell 2014). We conducted a cross-case analysis, which allows for some repli-
cation in findings (Stuart et al. 2002). Internal validity (Lincoln and Guba 1986) was ensured
by triangulating data from interviews and document analysis (Bowen 2009). With several
sources of information available for each organisation in the sample, findings did not depend
on the interpretations and opinions of any one respondent. Our case selection is not based on
representative random samples (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) but rather focussed on the
contextual uniqueness of the cases studied, allowing for a detailed account of the cases that
can enable researchers to make an informed judgment about the possible transferability of
findings (Johnson et al. 2006). Reliability or dependability (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln
and Guba 1986; Lincoln et al. 2013) is achieved here by maintaining a case study database,
and using electronic storage of all data and notes that clearly document the research process,
thus allowing future researchers to repeat the analytical procedures (Stuart et al. 2002). A
well-defined case study protocol was also employed which included an interview guide, as
well as clear procedures to be followed when using it (Ellram 1996).
In the following section, we discuss each of the two humanitarian responses individually
and then detail the results of our cross-case analysis, building up a rich picture of the three
interdependent foci of the CAS framework as applied to HL responses.
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4 Case studies
The two case studies selected were the humanitarian responses to the January 2010 earth-
quake in Haiti and the July 2010 floods in Pakistan. These two natural disasters occurred in
the same year, but garnered differing levels of public interest, resulting in different funding
and organisational profiles in the responses, thus forming interesting and relevant divergent
cases. These two disasters were the largest of 2010, and both affected significant areas of
developing nations, impactingmillions of inhabitants and causing economic damage amount-
ing to billions of dollars. Disasters several years in the past were deliberately chosen to enable
respondents to reflect on the HL design and management approaches that were utilised at the
time, specifically, the ways in which HL responses interact with complexity and why they
can yield such differing outcomes.
4.1 Haiti
The emergency response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti was seen to be particularly
pertinent due to the high media attention and extensive levels of global aid, as well as the
significant problems associated with HL. On the 12th of January 2010, an earthquake with
a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale devastated the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince and
surrounding areas, with a series of strong aftershocks adding to the destruction (Margesson
and Taft-Morales 2010). The Em-Dat database (2015) lists the number of total deaths as
222,570 with 3,700,000 people affected and a total economic damage of US $30 billion, thus
making it the largest natural disaster of 2010. By December 2012, US $6.373 billion had
been pledged by nations and international institutions such as the European Commission,
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti
2013). With a GDP of US $6.623 billion in 2010 and a GDP per capita of US $665.63, Haiti
was both a small economy and among the lowest income countries in the world (World Bank
Data 2020) and already the recipient of extensive developmental humanitarian assistance
(Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010).
HL was complicated by damage to the port of Port-au-Prince, which only became oper-
ational again ten days after the earthquake due to the anchoring of a floating pier (United
States Southern Command 2010). The US military took over management of the only inter-
national airport and created a system for coordinating its limited capacity (Haiti Logistics
Cluster 2010). The main road connection to the Dominican Republic was also damaged, but
promptly repaired by the neighbouring country (Holguín-Veras et al. 2012). The Logistics
Cluster determined that the capital of the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, would be
used as a staging area for inbound air and sea shipments before onward transportation by air,
road, or sea to delivery points within Haiti (Haiti Logistics Cluster 2010). On the demand
side, shelter and drinking water were priorities, particularly as water was in insufficient sup-
ply even before the earthquake. Food supplies were also urgently needed as much of the
personal, commercial, and humanitarian organisation’s inventories within the country had
been destroyed by the disaster (Holguín-Veras et al. 2012). Efforts were made to ensure that
the humanitarian response addressed needs outside of Port-au-Prince, as demand was high
across large parts of the country (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2010). The international
humanitarian response was significant, with an estimated 400 international actors deployed
to Haiti by the end of January 2010, with estimates of between 1000 and 2000 international
agencies being involved in the response (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2010). Due to the
geographical proximity, amultitude of US organisationswere involved, and significantmedia
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attention resulted in new actors engaging with the response, many of whom were inexperi-
enced humanitarians (DARA 2011). The response originated from a wide range of nations
including non-traditional donor countries like Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba (Margesson and
Taft-Morales 2010; DARA 2011).
4.2 Pakistan
Pakistan had a GDP of US $177.66 billion in 2010 and a GDP per capita of US $987.41, both
of which were significantly higher than in Haiti (World Bank Data 2020). In contrast to the
Haiti case study, the emergency response to the Pakistan floods of July 2010 suffered from
a lack of media attention and global aid. On 26th July 2010, heavy monsoon rains in several
regions of Pakistan resulted in a major flood in the Indus River Basin, with water covering
up to 20% of Pakistan’s total surface area, and not receding until the autumn (Singapore
Red Cross 2010; International Development Committee 2011). The Em-Dat database (2015)
lists the number of total deaths as 1985 with 13,400,000 people affected and total economic
damage of US $9.5 billion, thus affecting significantly more people than the earthquake in
Haiti in the same year, but causing less deaths and economic damage. It is estimated that
more than 12 million people were displaced and 1.7 million homes were either damaged or
completely destroyed, which demanded a humanitarian response on an unprecedented scale,
putting strain upon the resources of both humanitarian aid organisations and donor countries
that were already stretched by the Haiti response (International Development Committee
2011). The scale of the damage resulted in the largest appeal in the history of the UN,
as the Government of Pakistan requested US $459 million for a three-month period and a
funding requirement of US $1.9 billion was identified for a one-year period (International
Development Committee 2011).
Given the scale of the emergency and the insufficient local capacity and experience in
disaster management, the response suffered from limitations in terms of aid delivery (Polas-
tro et al. 2011). As a result of the Haiti earthquake, stocks of nationally-produced relief
items such as tents were depleted and there was no production capacity to match demand
(Polastro et al. 2011). NATO offered assets including an air bridge from Europe to Islam-
abad to facilitate fast and cost-efficient movement of goods, but while use of the air bridge
by humanitarian organisations was strongly advocated by the UK, US, and Pakistan gov-
ernments, many viewed this use of military assets as a breach of humanitarian principles
(International Development Committee 2011; Madiwale and Virk 2011). The impact of the
flood was very different in each province due to the changing nature of the disaster, the dif-
ferent levels of preparedness, and the access to individual and common resources (Polastro
et al. 2011). Demand was greatest for improved water and sanitation, with food, medicines
and healthcare increasing in importance 6 months after the disaster as households reported
unmet needs (Kirsch et al. 2013). The government of Pakistan distributed cash-based assis-
tance under theWatan scheme, which providedmuch needed local aid, but was also criticised
for being overly bureaucratic and inflexible (International Development Committee 2011).
Across the response, there was extensive usage of military assets for transport; Pakistan’s
armed forces spent nearly a quarter of their annual budget on the flood response, but in areas
such as Balochistan, which was in armed conflict with the Pakistan government at the time,
using the army for humanitarian purposes was not possible (Madiwale and Virk 2011). The
armywas praised for its swift initial response and its effort in restoring transport infrastructure
and enabling road access (International Development Committee 2011). Significant funding
and donations in kind were raised outside of the UN appeal, often originating from emerging
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Table 4 Summary of findings
CAS Focus Common Themes Haiti Pakistan




































































and non-traditional donors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani Diaspora, and the
private sector (Polastro et al. 2011).
5 Cross-case analysis
The previous sections have provided an overview of the complexity of the operational envi-
ronment to the two humanitarian responses. Issues highlighted are in concordance with the
extant literature, for example the uncertainties of funding in humanitarian organisations. In
this section, we conduct a cross-case analysis of the effects of that complexity across organ-
isational boundaries, and the ways in which HL responses interact with them. We conduct
the cross-case analysis from the perspective of HL as a CAS by using Choi et al.’s (2001)
framework of three CAS interdependent foci; internal mechanisms, environment, and co-
evolution as outlined in Table 1. We consider each of these foci in turn, offer examples from
the field, and discuss the implications for HL across the two case studies in accordance with
the research questions. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 4 outlining common
themes that emerged in both cases and themes that were distinct to each case.
5.1 Internal mechanisms
To function as a CAS, agents connect with other agents in the system and make decisions
based on imperfect information (Schein 1994; Choi et al. 2001). Our data indicates that there
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are similar characteristics in both cases regarding agents’ attributes and their interaction.
Beneficiaries, donors, the military, and local and international NGOs were the key actors
involved in both humanitarian responses. These agents form a complex network.
To deliver humanitarian assistance as part of a CAS, agents must work together. We
found, however, that in both case studies, there was limited connectivity among agents and
that a culture of sharing was less evident. Agents appeared to be working independently and
in competition, thus reducing the opportunities for shared learning that is necessary for a
coherent and structured humanitarian response. The lack of shared learning was linked back
to the lack of experience and expertise of some agents:
‘The performance of the cluster system was mixed […] only those agencies with
operational experience and a proven record in the sector should be involved in cluster
meetings and that information should be shared with others in a less resource intensive
manner.’ (P8)
Agents from diverse sectors and with a variety of motivations can be connected in the con-
text of HL and enter into competition for resources, services, donations, and beneficiaries. In
Pakistan, there was intense competition between agents on both the donor and the beneficiary
side of the humanitarian response (P2, P4, P6). The Haiti response had media attention and
sufficient funding, but had agents scrambling for their share of the overall monetary flow
(H1, H2, H6, H7, H8). Agents readily acknowledged the competitive culture, which was
perceived by some as a threat to the overall relief operation:
‘Unfortunately, you have to say that it is quite a big competition […] the real problem
is that people do not want those efficiencies. The brand of an organization has to be
seen first, particularly in sexy disasters. Every organisation wants to be seen as leading
the way.’ (H6)
The impact of the culture of competition and lack of connectivity was an unwillingness,
or inability, to self-organise as a HL relief effort. The outcome of agents’ self-organisation
was the duplication of efforts, with interviewees acknowledging that ‘there is very little
cooperation […] we need to stop replication and draw on each other’s strengths’ (P6).
In theHaiti response, beneficiary involvement was seen as themost crucial aspect of stake-
holder management owing to the very complex situation in a country that was already deeply
impoverished before the earthquake (H1, H2, H4, H6, H9), but respondents acknowledged
that donor demands were frequently prioritised (H1, H6, H7). In the Pakistan response, ben-
eficiary involvement was limited because of the security concerns inherent to the response,
despite organisations realising that having closer interactions with beneficiaries was essential
for the sustainability and impact of their work (P3, P6, P8). Limited interaction with ben-
eficiaries carried the risk of jeopardising humanitarian principles, as safe areas and groups
of people are prioritised, rather than those in most need of assistance (P8), which in turn
can create further security concerns (P5). This highlights the complexity of interactions with
beneficiaries as key agents in the CAS.
Within the definition of internal mechanisms, the dimensionality of a CAS is defined as
the degrees of freedom that the individual agent is able to act autonomously without relying
on other agents (Dooley and Van de Ven 1999). We found that there were three main factors
that reduce the agents’ degrees of freedom in the context of HL. First, maintaining neutrality
appeared to reduce dimensionality; we found that maintaining neutrality in these highly
political disaster responses presented a major challenge (H1, H6, H7, P5, P6, P7, P8). While
some organisations were very open in their approach to lobbying, describing it as essential
to ‘work with the governments and the ones that decide where the money goes’ (H1), others
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were very sceptical of any political engagement, insisting that their neutrality was their very
raison d’être (H2, H7). While most organisations firmly insist on their neutrality, even if they
closely cooperate with the military for practical reasons (P4, P8), they also acknowledge the
intense political nature of their work:
‘There’s a lot that’s fluff, policy and other things and politics in these organisations but
by and large we are probably a more political organisation than anything else.’ (P7)
‘Neutrality and all that rubbish… those are all fine principles, but it is a very political
context and everybody who does not admit that is simply telling lies.’ (H6)
Second, accountability to donors also limits dimensionality. The requirement for high
visibility in order to attract donations made the response a matter of prestige for HL organ-
isations, both established ones and newcomers to the humanitarian industry (H1, H7). This
would indicate that agents’ actions for attracting and maintaining donations might be pri-
oritised over the concerns of the beneficiaries. Donor involvement was seen as a substantial
challenge, but also of high importance as accountability to donors shapes and guides perfor-
mance inHL (H2, H3, H6, P1, P4, P7). Donors gave guidelines for an organisation’s spending
and demand accountability (H6), or earmarked funding for particular activities (P3). There
was a drive towards the efficient use of resources, as donors demanded evidence of how their
money was being used, thus increasing financial prudence and having a significant impact on
how resources are deployed (H1, H5, H9). Respondents also pointed out that donor demands
were not always reasonable and that they struggled to complywith themwhilst trying to focus
on beneficiary needs (H3, H6, P5, P7). Haiti was seen as an anomaly among respondents
as the extensive media engagement resulted in a significant influx of donations; this was in
sharp contrast to other disaster responses in the same year that struggled for funding (H6,
H8, H9):
‘Earthquake Haiti, everybody wants to donate everything, but other areas don’t receive
quite as much media attention, it’s a lot more difficult.’ (H5)
Delays to the disbursement of requested funds in the Pakistan case study (P8) led to it being
‘a struggle to keep all of that funded’ (P3) continuously, particularly as media attention tends
to move away from longer-term disasters such as floods over time (P4, P7). The resources
of many agents were already stretched due to the Haiti earthquake earlier in the year and the
willingness and ability of donors to contribute to yet another major humanitarian response
was questionable at best (P8). Much of the received funding was ear-marked for Haiti and
therefore could not be used in Pakistan (P1, P4, P7, P8). Therefore, needs in Pakistan remained
unmet (P5, P7), while in Haiti money might have been spent carelessly by some agents (H1).
Third, in both responses,military involvementwas a significant concern, which can further
limit dimensionality (H5, H7,H9,H10, P1, P2, P4, P7, P8). The Pakistan army had previously
been employed in some of the affected regions in a defensive capacity; this resulted in
tensions with the affected populations, as well as reports of humanitarian organisations being
denied access to certain affected areas (P2, P5, P8). However, the significant contribution of
the national military forces (especially in the immediate aftermath of the floods) was also
acknowledged by some who felt ‘the Pakistan military played a pivotal role in the response
across the country in rescuing the stranded population and providing the basic services’ (P3).
Similarly, international military forces were deployed despite unease about their impact on
the key humanitarian principles (P1, P2, P5):
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‘We strongly support key humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. Using
military assets for the delivery of humanitarian assistance is generally an option of
last resort in conflict-affected areas because the intentions of such assistance could be
misconstrued.’ (P8)
In Haiti, US Army support was accepted by the Haitian president to help coordinate
the influx of goods into the single airport in the country, which was clogged up with aid
deliveries and not utilising its full capacity due to inefficient air traffic control (H9). Intervie-
wees recognised that the involvement of the US Army enabled essential support that allowed
humanitarian organisations to better coordinate their efforts, whilst also ensuring that desper-
ately needed supplies could actually enter the country (H7,H10). Some participants, however,
voiced concerns over the undue influence a foreign military power may have in shaping the
fate of a sovereign nation (H5, H7).
Taken together, although the agents’ degrees of freedom were limited by accountability
to donors, maintaining neutrality and concerns about military involvement, they were still
able to act in an autonomous fashion on the ground. This was demonstrated in the form
of the simultaneous and parallel actions of agents with different skillsets and motivations.
Therefore, with no one agent deliberately organising and controlling the HL activities, we
see that the focus of the agents’ response efforts remains at the organisational, rather than
systemic level, which may have a negative impact on a unified, effective systemic response.
Neither case study exhibited clear examples of connectivity, or of shared learning, between
the agents that comprised the humanitarian responses.
5.2 Environment
HL operates in a particularly challenging external environment, which is dynamic as it is con-
stantly changing. Respondents described the environment as ‘volatile’ (P1) and ‘an uncertain
business’ (P7), which made it difficult for agents to collect real-time information. Conse-
quently, plans and actions are based on out-dated information (H2, H3, H10). Humanitarian
operations (particularly in the initial stages)were severely hampered by out-dated information
on which plans and actions were based (H2, H3), for example through inaccurate numbers of
inhabitants in an area resulting in insufficient amounts of goods being distributed, or incorrect
maps causing transport delays (H10). In some cases, even when every effort was made to
collect pertinent data centrally, by the time it was distributed and ready to be used in the
field, logisticians found themselves working to situations that had changed significantly; this
resulted in inadequate needs assessment, which led to aid not meeting the needs of bene-
ficiaries or, even worse, not even reaching some beneficiaries (H2, H3). External sources
of data were often not adequate or suitable for the particular challenges of HL (H3, H10).
In contrast to Pakistan, where more local knowledge was utilised, agents in Haiti failed to
successfully adapt to the rapid changes as they were unable to obtain real-time informa-
tion. Thus, local knowledge was considered as the best source of information and was of
vital importance when coordinating and instigating the humanitarian response (P1, P2, P4).
For example, local connections enabled extensive local sourcing as potential suppliers were
already known to NGOs (P2, P4, P8).
There was a clear awareness that the information base needed to be improved in order
to progress the development of HL, and that a variety of inputs from various views was
required (H1, H4, H10). Whenever it was available, the use of actual, accurate data had a
highly positive impact on logistics performance by improving purchasing and forecasting
accuracy, forcing agents to prioritise data collection (H3, H9, H10, P2, P4). However, there
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was also a feeling that record keeping took attention away from more important tasks, with
P5 stating ‘the focus is on the patient, not on the records.’
The lack of infrastructurewas amajor challenge for humanitarian agents in the aftermath of
both disasters (H6,H7,H9, P1, P2, P6).However, agentswere experienced in improvisation in
order to reach beneficiaries and set up supply lines (P1, P6). In Haiti, respondents recounted
their difficulties in physically getting goods, as well as personnel, into the country to an
extent that astonished even experienced logisticians (H7). Once goods had entered Haiti, the
situation did not improve, as the national transport infrastructure had been destroyed or had
never existed to begin with (H6), an issue that was also highlighted in Pakistan (P2). In some
cases, the only way to reach affected communities was with military vehicles and expertise
(P8). It was then also noted that the military controlled access to assets and monopolised
some of the existing transport infrastructure, further impeding access to certain areas (P2,
P8). Another characteristic of the dynamic environment that is reflected in the two cases is
how the boundaries of systems temporarily shift as different agents are included or excluded
(e.g. including new sourcing partners (P2, P4, P8) or excluding the military (H1, H7)). We
found clear evidence of the dynamic environment of HL characterised by constantly shifting
norms, rules and performance criteria.
In Haiti, global political priorities were felt to determine the amount of attention and
resources the humanitarian response received, and as such they had to be managed carefully
(H1, H7, H8, H10). In Pakistan, high levels of funding from international governmental
donors resulted in high reliance on global political priorities and as such called humani-
tarian principles into question (P2, P3, P4, P8). In both responses, there was concern for
the sustainability of projects initiated based on political agendas rather than on interaction
with beneficiaries and recipient communities (H2, H7, H8, P2, P3).While most organisations
maintained their neutrality and political independence as a core humanitarian principle, there
was generally an acknowledgement that for the continuity of their humanitarian work in a
particular area, agents needed to respect the politics in the context they operated in to a certain
degree (P1, P2, P3, P8).
The same was true for local political impact. Humanitarian organisations often saw their
role as advocates for the people they interact with and took their task of influencing and shap-
ingpolitical agendas seriously (P5, P6, P8). Therewas an acknowledgement that humanitarian
work could potentially drive political change for the better, especially since politics often
directly affected the populations that humanitarian organisations worked with (P5, P6). Inter-
viewees observed that the national government of Haiti had been criticised for uncooperative
behaviour, exerting its sovereignty particularly with regard to importing humanitarian sup-
plies (H1, H3, H7, H9). On a local level in Pakistan, tribal structures played a very important
role in reaching affected populations and ensuring the safety of humanitarian organisations
(P1, P2, P8). Some of the areas most affected by the floods were Federally Administered
Tribal Areas and others had a very strong presence of local governance structures that were
in some instances outside of the influence of the federal government of Pakistan, which con-
trolled the access and mobility of humanitarian agents on a local level (P8). This influenced
the ways in which agents could operate significantly, necessitating interactions with a mul-
titude of different groups to gain access to affected populations (P1, P2). These examples
illustrate the many factors that are outside of the boundary of the CAS but nevertheless have
a significant influence on the humanitarian response.
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5.3 Co-evolution
In a developedCAS, co-evolutionwould gradually occurwhereby a state of quasi-equilibrium
becomes the normand the systemcan retain some semblance of order and also be agile enough
to react to environmental changes (Goldstein 1994). As a consequence of its challenging
operating environment, the quasi-equilibrium of HL is consistently disrupted. In examining
the internal mechanisms dimension, it was recognised that competition detracted from the
shared learning that could enable better adaptation to the changing realities. While the Haiti
earthquake response highlighted significant problems and emphasised the importance of
managing HL relationships (H9), these lessons were not learned for the Pakistan floods (P1,
P7). Simultaneous and parallel actions of independent agents according to their individual
priorities resulted in inefficiencies across the CAS with duplication of efforts a problem
in both Haiti (H6, H7, H8) and Pakistan (P1, P2, P6). Furthermore, excessive bureaucracy
slowed down the delivery of humanitarian aid (P1, P4), for example with customs barriers:
‘Containers stuck in customs for months on end in Haiti for reasons that are unclear
to us and I don’t know if that’s politics at play or just inefficiency of the systems or
something else’ (H9)
While individual agents were practiced in adapting to constant changes, the overall adapt-
ability of the CAS was a challenge. For example, interacting with changing local contacts
required a high degree of cultural sensitivity that was easier to achieve for organisations that
had a long-standing presence in the affected area, while others attempted, with little success,
to employ standardised approaches developed in other responses (H8, P2, P5).
While both case studies started out as humanitarian responses to large-scale natural dis-
asters, the interactions of agents and environment created different outcomes for the CAS
in each case. In both Haiti and Pakistan, the environment and the network of agents were
highly complex and dynamic. However, the Haiti response is recognised as particularly poor
by respondents (H1, H2, H4, H6, H9). Respondents in the Haiti case study criticised a lack
of engagement with competitors, highlighting an over-reliance on wider political priorities
and the whims of donors rather than any actual engagement with the local communities (H1,
H2, H9). The Haiti response is well-known for setting a very negative example:
‘We are mainly concerned with aid reaching the beneficiaries. Which it often doesn’t.
A lot of it gets lost. Haiti is probably the prime example for how the international aid
industry — it really is an industry! — can create even more of a disaster.’ (H1)
Due to cultural difficulties and access issues, stakeholder interactions in Pakistan had to be
far more collaborative than in other responses (P2, P3, P4, P8), especially when planning
longer-term relief efforts (P5, P8). In CAS terms, this demonstrates a somewhat higher level
of connectivity between agents in Pakistan, while connectivity was limited in Haiti.
In both case studies, respondents did see opportunities for improvement across their oper-
ations ‘if we harmonised supply chains across not just organisations, but companies as well’
(H9). However, respondents were also critical of the initiatives to bring some organisation
and coordination to the aid efforts:
‘There has been the Log Cluster […] it was absolutely derided there. It doesn’t organise
anything, it’s just another way for people to feel important about themselves.’ (H6)
A high degree of flexibility was required to enable organisations and their HLs to respond to
the constantly changing local demands (H3, H10), with improvisation often being the only
way to respond (H3, H8, P1, P2, P7). This demonstrates adaptation as the CAS develops.
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In Pakistan, attention was only drawn to HL because of significant supply problems, which
several interviewees welcomed as an opportunity to highlight the necessity of investment in
logistics in order to make improvements (P1, P7). In such a volatile environment where both
sourcing and distribution were a challenge, interviewees acknowledged that ‘you are much
more aware of logistics’ (P1). Interviewees highlighted the difficulties that every agent faced
when logistics was challenged with overwhelming issues such as impeded access to affected
regions (P1, P6). A similar effect was observed in Haiti:
‘The earthquake definitely changed the way that people view supply chain and really
emphasised the importance of having a really strong, solid supply chain system.’ (H9)
A CAS both reacts to and creates its environment (Choi et al. 2001). However, assessing
the impact of HL activities proved to be almost impossible. While organisations were able to
measure input and output, the actual impact of their work remained unknown (P2, P3). There
was usually a good understanding of centralised events within HL, and a general overview of
the input and output of each of the humanitarian responses an organisation was involved in.
However, as impact assessment needed to be conducted at a local level, a general overview
only provided organisations with a fragmented and unreliable understanding of their work
(P2, P3). In consequence, organisations’ understanding of their own work, and the metrics
they reported to donors andother interested parties, usually did not include impact assessment,
even though the desirability and even necessity of such measures was appreciated (P5, P7).
Thus, it was deemed impossible to clearly evidence cause and effect within the CAS.
While Pakistan was described as a more structured environment, co-evolution failed to
achieve any sort of quasi-equilibrium in Haiti. Interviewees blamed the very chaotic situation
in the already deeply impoverished country, compounded by the death of many officials
and local humanitarian workers (H3, H6, H8), as well as the inexperience of many of the
humanitarian organisations that sprung up to respond to the earthquake (H1, H4, H5, H8).
In Haiti, the capital Port-au-Prince was the focal point of the majority of the international
aid shipments and grew congested very quickly (H2, H3, H7, H10). Generally, there was
very little patience with the plentiful newcomers, as ‘we know what we are doing and we
are not here to waste our time teaching some little goody two shoes’ (H7). The lack of
experience and expertise of these newcomers was accused of reducing the efficiency of the
relief operation; for example, the newcomers were perceived to prolong meetings and thus
detract from the actual delivery of aid (H6). Cooperationwith both non-profit and commercial
organisations was identified as a solution by interviewees, but there was limited reflection
as to how this would work in practice (H2, H4, H9). Furthermore, the severely disrupted
government and international aid structures in Haiti that resulted from the earthquake created
an added layer of complexity, obscuring cause and effect relationships on a local level.
This resulted in unchecked and uncoordinated agent activity that failed to achieve desirable
systemic outcomes, leading to respondents remarking that ‘Haiti is known as the Republic
of NGOs’ (H9).
Our findings suggest that optimisation of sourcing at the local levelwas difficult to achieve.
Respondents highlighted that their ‘biggest issue is the way of sourcing and the continuity’
(P3) and many struggled to move aid deliveries into the affected areas (P1, P3, P4, P6, P8).
It was noted that local sourcing was highly desirable for the ease of logistics (especially with
regard to avoiding additional import costs) as well as supporting, instead of undermining, the
economy of the affected area; however, interviewees pointed out the difficulties of sourcing
locally in a country that had been devastated to such a scale as Pakistan in these floods
(P1, P3, P6). Similar issues were present in Haiti (H5) where ‘there isn’t enough food that
you could buy locally, again with consistency, quality throughout the year’ (H2). Therefore,
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global sourcing was popular, for economies of scale, as well as the development of long-term
relationships that guaranteed reliable supplies with acceptable quality. When organisations
relied mainly on a small number of global suppliers (H2, H10, P4, P8), this had the potential
to make global sourcing ‘the easiest part, because we are working globally, we are procuring
with 10–20 different suppliers’ (H10), especially for demand that was consistent across
different humanitarian responses.
A lack of willpower in making sustainable changes in the political and social landscape
of Haiti was observed both among humanitarian organisations and local structures (H1, H2,
H6, H9, H10). Respondents observed an attitude among humanitarian organisations that was
not focussed on actually improving the situation within the country, but rather often actively
contradicting or evading local governance structures (H1, H9, H10):
‘You have all of these entities operating within a sovereign country that are not really
listening or following the directives of the sovereign country, an —albeit question-
ably— democratically elected, but nonetheless a democratically elected government’
(H9)
This led one respondent to a sobering conclusion that questions the very morality and moti-
vation of the whole humanitarian sector:
‘The NGOs really don’t want to be held accountable. […] It’s bitter, but it’s true;
nobody has an interest in making things better. They have an interest in keeping their
own jobs, that’s all. And they keep their jobs if they keep the people in the country
small and the suffering continues’ (H1)
This conclusion also demonstrates the difficulties of improving operations in aCAS as agents’
efforts are contingent on the performance of other parts of the system.
6 Discussion
This study has showcased not only the complexity of HL in both the academic literature
and in practice but has also extended the current body of knowledge by applying CAS
to this research area using data gathered from practitioners. We have examined the main
characteristics of complexity in HL alongside how the humanitarian response reacts to this
complexity. By adopting CAS as our theoretical frame, our findings show how co-evolution
in HL is critical to delivering outcomes; examples show how shortcomings in co-evolution
severely hampered relief efforts.We therefore offer a theoretical contribution to thefield ofHL
by positing that a humanitarian SC must not only react to its environment, it must also create
its environment. Previous work has discussed how in complex operating environments, the
logistics function has to adapt and becomemore anticipatory to survive not merely disruption
within SCs, but also macro-level volatility (Christopher 2005; Harrington et al. 2011). We
go further by proposing that adaptability is insufficient for all HL contexts and, rather than
reactively adapting, in some instances HLmust proactively create the conditions under which
humanitarian relief can be delivered.A failure to do so can negatively impactHLperformance,
which is, as previous work highlights, crucial for financial, as well as moral reasons (Jabbour
et al. 2017; Banomyong et al. 2019; Anaya-Arenas et al. 2014).
By examining how the complexity inherent inHL impactsHLoutcomes, our study demon-
strates the importance of highly complex systems that are formed for a specific purpose and
for a limited time frame; a clear departure from the notion of stable, long-term, linear SCs and
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networks.We showhowHLoperates as aCAS and offer practical examples ofHL complexity
and how these impact on the outcome of the humanitarian response. In the dynamic context
of HL, given the inability of one type of response to fit the requirements of every situation,
performance appears to be contingent on HL’s ability not only to react to but also to create its
environment. CAS as a theoretical lens furthers our understanding of how and why humani-
tarian response efforts can yield vastly differing outcomes. Our discussion below addresses
each of the research questions in turn and develops propositions to provide a springboard for
further research.
6.1 What are themain characteristics of complexity in humanitarian logistics?
Our findings support previous work that acknowledges the complexity of HL (Hilhorst 2002;
Vaillancourt 2016), and furthermore demonstrate that HL exhibits the characteristics of a
CAS (Choi et al. 2001). Our particular focus is on characteristics of complexity across
organisational boundaries (which we achieved by making the humanitarian response our unit
of analysis) and the ways in which HL interacts with complexity. In addressing research
question 1: ‘What are the main characteristics of complexity in humanitarian logistics?’, we
find the internal mechanisms and environment perspectives from our analytical framework to
be helpful. We find three important examples of characteristics of complexity emerging from
our cross-case analysis that have a negative impact on the humanitarian response; (1)multiple
agents with limited connectivity, (2) concerns about maintaining neutrality, and (3) the high
degree of environmental uncertainty. These complexity characteristics are inter-related and
impact the humanitarian response. We provide a full discussion of each below.
Multiple agents with limited connectivity was a key facet of the internal mechanisms of the
humanitarian response in both case studies and was stressed repeatedly by every respondent,
with particular reference to the involvement of beneficiaries in the responses, accountability
to and communication with donors, as well as interactions with the military. Rather than
connecting, competition between agents featured strongly in both case studies, as working
together was often seen not to be in their best interest. The dichotomy of cooperation and
competition inherent to a CAS (Surana et al. 2005) was frequently addressed by interviewees,
showing evidence that it creates emergent and highly dynamic realities.
Despite the lack of financial remuneration, beneficiaries are customers of HL (Oloruntoba
and Gray 2009; Charles et al. 2010; Schiffling and Piecyk 2014), yet limited connectivity
posed challenges to reaching consensus on a diverse range of opinions, particularly those
related to local involvement and security. An inability to agree on the course of action slowed
down the humanitarian response and the ability to meet the needs of beneficiaries. Satisfying
the accountability requirements from donors was also hampered by limited connectivity.
Accountability to donors is growing, as many parties increasingly scrutinise the humanitarian
organisations’ spending (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009; Moore and Taylor 2011),
which made respondents more aware of the need to report back to donors, yet reaching
agreement on how this should be done posed challenges between agents. In theHaiti response,
the relationship with the media was hampered by the limited connectivity between multiple
agents. While the relationship with the media is often a strained one, it retains a vital function
in soliciting donations and communicating with stakeholders (Faulkner 2001; Ritchie 2004;
Van Wassenhove 2006; Lettieri et al. 2009).
A related consequence of the limited connectivity between agents appeared to be their
unwillingness, or inability, to self-organise. The lack of self-organisation increased com-
plexity for HL due to the interdependency of its constituent parts. Complexity here was
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characterised by the duplication of efforts across agents due to a lack of self-organisation.
Duplication has previously been identified as a problem in HL and various efforts have been
made to avoid it (Kovács and Spens 2009; Day 2014), with limited success as per the findings
from our study.
In further examining the relationship between limited connectivity and the humanitarian
response, we offer the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Limited connectivity between agents inhibits the ability of HL to self-organise
resulting in a negative impact on the speed of the humanitarian response.
Concerns about maintaining neutrality were linked to complexity. There was significant
concern about maintaining neutrality in both humanitarian responses, which links to the fun-
damental humanitarian principles (VanWassenhove 2006). Global political priorities shaped
the responses, as well as the influence of local governments. Previous studies discussed the
problem of donations being tied to external agendas rather than the precise needs of the
humanitarian organisations (Beamon and Balcik 2008; Jahre and Heigh 2008). In this study,
differences between agents were particularly apparent as they had different philosophical
backgrounds (Dunantist versus Wilsonian), making them more or less willing to tie them-
selves to political agendas or interact with military forces in their work or to compromise
neutrality in the interest of reaching beneficiaries (Stoddard 2003). Their stance on neutral-
ity placed restrictions on how individual agents operated, particularly at the local level, thus
reducing autonomy and causing frustration. Differing views on neutrality increased complex-
ity due to a lack of clarity and agreement about the most appropriate course of action. The
impact of neutrality has significant implications for HL and hence we develop the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The diversity of approaches to interactions with military and political entities
gives agents greater autonomy to make decisions at a local level, and amplifies differences
in outcomes in parts of the humanitarian response.
The high degree of environmental uncertainty impacted both of the humanitarian responses
due to the limited ability to formulate a workable strategy prior to arriving in the country.
A common feature in the HL literature is the destruction or general lack of infrastructure
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005; Altay et al. 2009; Holguín-Veras et al. 2012), which was also
a key finding from our study. In both cases the extent of the destruction needed to be wit-
nessed first-hand prior to a response being developed. Significant uncertainty arose from the
continually changing situation, which inhibited the development of routines, as is typical
in emergency responses (Beamon and Balcik 2008; Chandes and Pache 2010). Our study
found that humanitarian logisticians did not appear to be particularly concerned about how
this uncertainty increased the complexity of their work; there was a sense of pride in being
able to cope with such challenges and conduct their daily business to a reasonable standard
despite all the adversities that inhibit the development of routines. Yet the constant disrup-
tion and change had a negative impact on the image of logistics, which has been linked to a
dearth of professionalism (Walker 2004; Kovács et al. 2012), and an exclusion of the profes-
sion from strategic planning (Van Wassenhove 2006; Pettit and Beresford 2009), which has
implications for the humanitarian response. We therefore posit that:
Proposition 3 Developing routines as part of the humanitarian response has a significant
positive impact on the HL outcome and professional standing.
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Our study presents three important characteristics of complexity in HL. We find that the
individual agent’s response can increase and/or add new and different complexity to the
setting. This has been illustrated, for example, in our discussions on the willingness of agents
to connect and self-organise, or on an agent’s position regarding maintaining neutrality.
We have shown how agents are not collaborating, which leads to inefficiencies including
duplication and limited shared learning, and a slower response to the humanitarian disaster.
In essence, the behavioural response by agents is adding to the overall complexity of HL,
which leads to our fourth proposition:
Proposition 4 In the context of HL the behavioural response by agents has the potential to
increase the level of complexity.
6.2 How does the humanitarian response adapt to complexity?
In addressing research question 2: ‘How does the humanitarian response adapt to complex-
ity?’ we draw on the co-evolution dimension of our theoretical framework. It is important to
note that whilst our two case studies were focused on the same outcome, providing humani-
tarian relief following a disaster, the Pakistan example is perceived by the respondents in our
study to have delivered a more successful response than Haiti. The perceived success of the
Pakistan response is noteworthy because the scale of those affected by the disaster was greater
than that of Haiti and the funds were significantly lower. Despite the different circumstances
outlined above, it would therefore appear that the Pakistan humanitarian response was able
to adapt to complexity to deliver outcomes in perhaps a more sustained manner than the Haiti
response.
We see from the Pakistan case study that the co-evolution of internal mechanisms and the
environment resulted in the relief effort being able to respond to a disaster that impacted a
vast geographical area, particularly when compared with the more localised disaster in Haiti.
While the response to the Haiti earthquake was much better funded than that of the Pakistan
floods (and the earthquake affected fewer people across a smaller area), this did not translate
into better outcomes for the country. ‘Haiti is known as the Republic of NGOs’ (H9) and is
still struggling to recover a decade after the earthquake, with many subsequent issues blamed
on the initial disaster response. In this example, there appears to be no correlation between
the level of investment and the outcome.
A key aspect of the Pakistan response that appeared to support the relief effort was that
the CAS co-evolved by collaborating with actors within and outside of its boundary (e.g.
local organisations and the military) to shape the humanitarian response. It was recognised
that the environment of the Pakistan response was highly politicised, and this impacted
on the CAS as it struggled to find an equilibrium between delivering aid and maintaining
neutrality. Individual agents adapted to this challenge by defining their own priorities, shaping
their environment and deciding which compromises, if any, were viable for them. In other
instances, this approach may have led to sub-optimisation of the CAS as a whole, yet in
this context it achieved successful outcomes. We therefore offer an important theoretically
driven contribution by positing that in the HL context a CAS must both react to and create
its environment. It must therefore adapt and also create by developing bespoke approaches
to each humanitarian relief operation. Underestimating how a humanitarian response reacts
to and creates its environment could be a major reason why tools and techniques from
commercial logistics do not always apply in a humanitarian context. This finding leads to
our final proposition:
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Proposition 5 A humanitarian relief effort must react to and create its environment, therefore
bespoke approaches to HL are essential.
While there is an acknowledgement that people are drivers of dynamic SCs (Mangan et al.
2008), it has also been stated thatHL research has a tendency to over-simplify situations (Apte
2009; Day et al. 2012). This could explain why there is insufficient research addressing the
behavioural elements of HL, or in fact other complex logistics operations. Such operations
could include expeditionary military logistics and SCs for large sporting events such as the
Olympics or the Football World Cup. Complex logistics operations have to consider how to
address elements of behavioural complexity to ensure a holistic and sustainable approach.
It has previously been highlighted that behavioural studies in logistics and SC management
could be beneficial (Tokar 2010), and our study and propositions provide a springboard for
further work. Any concerted effort to improve HL and other complex logistics operations
has to originate from a thorough understanding of the complexities of the HL organisations’
response. It is not appropriate to ignore the complicating factors faced in practice if research
is to be relevant (Day et al. 2012; Day 2014).
Due to the complex nature of the setting, and of the two HL responses examined in our
case-study research, we show how each humanitarian response must react to and create its
environment. While standardisation has its place, even within complex logistics operations,
we cannot approach every humanitarian response in the same way. In tailoring approaches,
and ultimately solutions, to a given problem situation it is vital to consider its inherent
behavioural complexity, e.g. agents’ connectivity, inter and intraCAScompetition, competing
values of agents and willingness for shared learning, as we found in this study. Logistics
research, within and beyond the confines of HL, all too often ignores the individuals involved
and the interactions between them in favour of standardised approaches. In an era of volatility,
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, this mentality is no longer fit for purpose within HL,
or indeed within wider SC research and practice.
7 Conclusions and research implications
7.1 Theoretical implications
This study has presented a rich picture of two humanitarian responses, focussing on issues
inherent to HL, rather than to a particular organisation. Our study makes two important
theoretically driven contributions that have practical relevance. First, drawing onCAS theory,
we illustrate the main characteristics of complexity in HL and show how complexity impacts
the humanitarian response, thus extending our theoretical understanding of this complex
operating environment. CAS have previously been used in SC literature (Choi et al. 2001;
Pathak et al. 2007; Pathak et al. 2009), but have only received limited attention in HL (Day
2014). In general, there is a lack of engagement with theory in HL research (Oloruntoba et al.
2019). Our theoretical framing of the dimensions of a CAS offer a new way to conceptualise
HL on the wider scale of humanitarian responses or even the entire sector. To attempt to
solve problems within only one agency is a failure to understand interconnectedness which
cannot adequately address challenges of complex logistics operations. Complex problems can
only be approached holistically, with reductionist approaches yielding no or unsatisfactory
results (Gell-Mann 1994). Research needs to acknowledge that modern logistics may not be
suitable for study if the unit of analysis is a single organisation. This study has shown that
while differences between individuals and organisations exist, there are also over-arching
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issues that affect HL in particular responses irrespective of the organisational context. We
have highlighted connectedness, self-organisation and maintaining neutrality. With this, we
add to the growing body of research onHL by utilising empirical evidence (Kovács and Spens
2009; Tatham and Houghton 2011; Kovács et al. 2012; Pérouse de Montclos 2012; Wagner
and Thakur-Weigold 2018). To tackle the issues examined, the establishment of an evidence
base that reaches across organisational boundaries is vital.
7.2 Managerial implications
We have shown how HL needs to both react to and create its environment in order to thrive in
this complex context. HL is a CAS that interacts extensively with its environment. Our find-
ings suggest that managers in humanitarian organisations need to reassess the utility of tools
and techniques borrowed from commercial SCs. Managers also need to take a more holistic
perspective and develop interventions that are more likely to be effective, thereby building a
bridge between commercial andHLpractices. Particular attention should be paid to equipping
the humanitarian response to react to and create its environment, and the acknowledgement
that bespoke HL solutions are required to attain better performance.
7.3 Limitations and future research directions
Our study is not without its limitations, most significantly with the primary data collected.
Given the importance of stakeholders that emerged from the primary data, only including
actors from humanitarian organisations in the sample does not provide a comprehensive pic-
ture of the entire system. No beneficiaries, political decision makers, commercial suppliers,
media representatives, or other stakeholders have been included in the sample. While such
stakeholders might have limited direct involvement in HL, they have considerable influence.
Each case study also includes a limited number of interviews. While care was taken to repre-
sent a range of organisations and job roles, these interviews cannot claim to provide a complete
picture of the humanitarian responses. The balance of organisational sizes represented in the
sample skews towards larger organisations, which are likely to be more established, but could
also be less flexible than smaller organisations. Furthermore, the majority of interviewees
were male, including all of those identifying as logisticians. Future studies in this area should
address the size and composition of samples.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study draws on important qualitative findings to
provide a rich picture of two highly complex HL contexts. By offering theoretically driven
insights garnered from those working in the field, our study goes some way to addressing the
limited empirical evidence base of HL and provides an important foundation for additional
studies on this crucial topic.
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